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ABSTRACT
SSCT Score for Malware Detection
by Srividhya Srinivasan
Metamorphic malware transforms its internal structure when it propagates, mak-
ing detection of such malware a challenging research problem. Previous research con-
sidered a score based on simple substitution cryptanalysis, which was applied to the
metamorphic detection problem. In this research, we analyze a new score based on
a combined simple substitution and column transposition (SSCT) cryptanalysis. We
show that this SSCT score significantly outperforms the simple substitution score—
and other malware detection scores—in many cases.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Malware is a piece of software written with malicious intent. Over the years,
malware have evolved to be more like benign software and hence it has become in-
creasingly difficult to tell them apart from a normal harmless program [19]. The
techniques used to detect malware files can be broadly classified under two categories
- dynamic and static malware analysis. In dynamic analysis, the malware is allowed
to be live in an emulated environment and its actions are observed. In static analysis,
the information extracted from the malware file is used to analyze and decide whether
the file is a malware or a benign file. Even from this high level definition, we can
see that dynamic analysis techniques are, in most cases, more expensive in terms of
running times than their static analysis counterparts.
Many malware detection techniques have been proposed and analyzed in the lit-
erature. Examples of such malware detection techniques include the Hidden Markov
Model approach in [1, 2], as well as a score that relies on simple substitution crypt-
analysis [8]. The Simple Substitution Distance (SSD) malware score in [8] is based on
Jakobsen’s algorithm [6], which is an extremely efficient attack on simple substitution
ciphers. Consequently, the SSD score computation is fast and efficient, and in [8] it
is shown to be very effective against some challenging classes of malware.
Signature-based virus detection systems search for a known pattern of bits or a
signature in the body of the malware. If malwares had stopped evolving, all viruses
could be detected by these systems. Unfortunately, that is not the case. Malware
developers constantly look for techniques to break the performance of the virus de-
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tection systems and sadly, keep succeeding in their attempts. Morphing the malware
code is one such technique used to evade signature detections.
Polymorphic malware consists of the malware code, which is encrypted, and a
module containing the decryption logic [13]. The decryption module is also morphed
so that it does not adopt a common signature. Metamorphic virus follows a similar
principle and mutates the virus body before infecting a system. There are several
techniques available to achieve this including, but not limited to register renaming,
renaming of subroutines and dead code insertion [13].
In both polymorphic and metamorphic viruses, each version of malware is differ-
ent from the previous known version. Due to this, they are difficult to detect using the
conventional signature based security systems. It is interesting to note that, through
the evolution of different versions of these malware, the underlying functionality re-
mains more or less the same. In such cases, it seems logical to view the known version
of a malware as the “plaintext” and the newer, unknown version to be an encrypted
cipher text. The unknown file or the ciphertext can be decrypted to see if it yields
any of the known malware. If it cannot be decrypted successfully, we can assume that
the unknown file is benign.
In this paper, we will discuss the use of an encryption technique called Simple
Substitution Columnar Transposition as a way to distinguish a malware file from
a benign file and compare the results obtained by this method with the existing
techniques in static analysis. This paper is organized into the following sections. In
this chapter, we have given a brief summary about polymorphic and metamorphic
malware and how encryption techniques can be used as malware detection techniques.
Chapter 2 talks about some existing implementation of this idea. In Chapter 3, we
have an overview of the SSCT cryptanalysis technique followed by a detailed account
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of our implementation. In Chapter 4, we present our experiments and the results
obtained. We conclude with Chapter 5, which talks about the future work in this
area.
3
CHAPTER 2
Previous Work
In this chapter, we will see some of the existing research that form the basis of
our SSCT implementation. Since SSCT encryption is an extension of the Simple Sub-
stitution technique, a deeper understanding of both the simple substitution method
and the Jakobsen’s algorithm which helps in solving it, will help us in breaking the
SSCT cipher.
2.1 Jakobsen’s Algorithm
The naive approach to decrypt a simple substitution cipher is outlined below:
1. Guess an initial key 𝐾
2. Decrypt the cipher using 𝐾
3. If the decrypted message does not make sense, modify the key 𝐾
4. Go to step 2
Jakobsen’s algorithm [6] provides a faster attack on the simple substitution cipher.
This method makes use of digraph statistics of the plaintext and the ciphertext.
Initially, the digraph frequencies of the plaintext letters are populated in the matrix
𝐸 and the digraph frequencies for the ciphertext are filled in the matrix 𝐷. We
compute the score for the initial 𝐷 matrix using the formula
Score =
∑︁
|𝑒𝑖𝑗 − 𝑑𝑖𝑗|
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Table 1: Caesar Cipher with key = 2
A B C D E F G H I J K L . . . S T U V W X Y Z
C D E F G H I J K L M N . . . U V W X Y Z A B
An initial key 𝐾 is guessed by comparing the individual letter frequencies in the
plaintext and the ciphertext [4]. For every change in 𝐾, the 𝐷 matrix changes as
follows: if 𝐾𝑖 and 𝐾𝑗 are swapped, then we swap the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ and 𝑗𝑡ℎ columns and rows
in the 𝐷 matrix. We compute the score for the modified 𝐷 matrix. If the score
improves, we retain the changes, otherwise we swap the rows and columns again and
continue with a different key.
2.2 Simple Substitution Distance
One of the earliest forms of encryption is the Caesar Cipher [13]. Here, the key is
an integer indicating the shift in the alphabet position. For example, if the key is 2,
every character in the alphabet maps to the character two units away from itself, as
shown in Table 1. Simple Substitution is a modification of the Caesar Cipher where
instead of a constant displacement, the key can be any permutation of the characters
in the alphabet.
In static analysis, opcode sequences are often extracted from a known malware
and compared to the opcode sequence from an unknown file [16]. By obtaining a
similarity measure between the two sequences, the unknown file is classified either
as a malware or a benign file. In these methods, opcodes are usually represented by
characters from the English alphabet, making the extracted opcode sequence a string
of letters from the English alphabet. Combining this representation and the opcode
substitution that we saw in Chapter 1 to morph the malware, we can look at an
unknown file as a cipher and try to decrypt it using the Simple Substitution method
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to see if resembles any known version of the virus.
An effective implementation of the Simple Substitution method to detect malware
is given in [8]. This implementation uses the Jakobsen’s algorithm to avoid repeated
decryption of the cipher or the unknown file.
Let us try to simulate the Jakobsen’s algorithm on an example. Let us consider
an alphabet with characters J,G,S,V and P in the decreasing order of their occurrence.
Let the original digraph frequency in this alphabet be the matrix shown in Table 2.
If our ciphertext is “GPSSPVJPSPSVJGSPJVJGSVSPVS”, based on the frequency,
we can come with the putative key shown in Table 3. The decrypted text using this
putative key is “PGJJGSVGJGJSVPJGVSVPJSJGSJ”. From this, we calculate the
digraph frequencies and arrive at the matrix 𝐷 given in Table 4. We calculate the
score for this putative key using these two matrices 𝐸 and 𝐷. As per Jakobsen’s
algorithm, the next step is two modify this putative key 𝐾 and recompute the score.
There are several ways to modify the key, but to maintain the simplicity of this ex-
ample, we swap the first two elements. When we decrypt now, the text obtained is
“PJGGJSVJGJGSVPGJVSVPGSGJSG”. With this plaintext, the new digraph fre-
quency matrix is given in Table 5. When we compare this with Table 4, we see that
columns 1 and 2 and rows 1 and 2 are swapped. This means that we do not have to
decrypt the ciphertext during every iteration in order to compute the score. Instead
we can build the 𝐷 matrix once, and swap its rows and columns based on the changes
to the key 𝐾.
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Table 2: Expected digraph frequency E
J G S V P
J 2 3 0 4 1
G 1 0 2 1 2
S 1 2 1 0 0
V 1 0 0 1 1
P 1 2 0 1 0
Table 3: Putative key
S P V J G
J G S V P
Table 4: Digraph frequency D
J G S V P
J 1 4 2 0 0
G 3 0 2 1 0
S 2 0 0 3 0
V 0 1 1 0 2
P 2 1 0 0 0
Table 5: Digraph frequency D
J G S V P
J 0 3 2 1 0
G 4 1 2 0 0
S 0 2 0 3 0
V 1 0 1 0 2
P 1 2 0 0 0
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CHAPTER 3
Simple Substitution Columnar Transposition
We will first see how a piece of plaintext is encrypted using the simple substi-
tution columnar transposition method. Once we have a clear understanding of the
encryption, we can work backwards and come up with the steps to retrieve the plain-
text from the ciphertext. This is crucial in implementing the scoring technique used
in our project.
3.1 SSCT Encryption
Simple Substitution Columnar Transposition is a form of encryption that adds
one more level of complexity to the simple substitution method. In this method, after
the plaintext symbols are replaced with the ciphertext symbols, the text is written in
the form of a matrix. The columns of this matrix are shuffled and the resulting text
forms the ciphertext.
Let us encrypt the text “either the well was very deep or she fell very slowly”
using SSCT, using the substitution key shown in Table 6. After substitution, the
text now becomes “abcdaecdafaggfhijaeklaamneidaoaggjaekignfgk”. We fill this in-
termediate ciphertext in a matrix as shown in Table 7. If the transposition key is
(1,4,5,2,10,8,9,7,6,3), we get the final matrix as shown in Table 9. We obtain the
ciphertext from this matrix, which in our case is “adabfdacecafhgkaejiglmnaodaieaa-
Table 6: Substitution Key
e i t h r w l a s v y d p o f
a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o
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Table 7: Intermediate matrix⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
𝑎 𝑏 𝑐 𝑑 𝑎 𝑒 𝑐 𝑑 𝑎 𝑓
𝑎 𝑔 𝑔 𝑓 ℎ 𝑖 𝑗 𝑎 𝑒 𝑘
𝑙 𝑎 𝑎 𝑚 𝑛 𝑒 𝑖 𝑑 𝑎 𝑜
𝑎 𝑔 𝑔 𝑗 𝑎 𝑒 𝑘 𝑖 𝑔 𝑛
𝑓 𝑔 𝑘 𝑥 𝑥 𝑥 𝑥 𝑥 𝑥 𝑥
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
Table 8: Ciphertext matrix⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
𝑎 𝑏 𝑐 𝑑 𝑎 𝑒 𝑐 𝑑 𝑎 𝑓
𝑎 𝑔 𝑔 𝑓 ℎ 𝑖 𝑗 𝑎 𝑒 𝑘
𝑙 𝑎 𝑎 𝑚 𝑛 𝑒 𝑖 𝑑 𝑎 𝑜
𝑎 𝑔 𝑔 𝑗 𝑎 𝑒 𝑘 𝑖 𝑔 𝑛
𝑓 𝑔 𝑘 𝑥 𝑥 𝑥 𝑥 𝑥 𝑥 𝑥
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
jagnigkegfxxgxxxxxk”.
3.2 Attack on SSCT Using Jakobsen’s Algorithm
An approach to break the Zodiac-340 cipher using a combination of the Simple
Substitutuion Columnar Transposition technique and the Jakobsen’s algorithm has
been outlined in the research paper [20]. A major difference between the SSD and
SSCT techniques is that in SSD, the plaintext and the ciphertext are a stream of
characters, whereas in SSCT, they are represented as a matrix. If the initial ciphertext
is represented as shown in Table 10, we need to store the digraph frequencies for every
permutation of the columns. We should also note that when the matrix is flattened
Table 9: Final ciphertext matrix⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
𝑎 𝑑 𝑎 𝑏 𝑓 𝑑 𝑎 𝑐 𝑒 𝑐
𝑎 𝑓 ℎ 𝑔 𝑘 𝑎 𝑒 𝑗 𝑖 𝑔
𝑙 𝑚 𝑛 𝑎 𝑜 𝑑 𝑎 𝑖 𝑒 𝑎
𝑎 𝑗 𝑎 𝑔 𝑛 𝑖 𝑔 𝑘 𝑒 𝑔
𝑓 𝑥 𝑥 𝑔 𝑥 𝑥 𝑥 𝑥 𝑥 𝑘
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
9
Table 10: Initial ciphertext matrix
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣
𝑐11 𝑐12 𝑐13 . . . 𝑐1𝑛
𝑐21 𝑐22 𝑐23 . . . 𝑐2𝑛
...
...
... . . .
...
𝑐𝑚1 𝑐𝑚2 𝑐𝑚3 . . . 𝑐𝑚𝑛
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦
out, the last element of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ row will be adjacent to the first element of the 𝑖+ 1𝑡ℎ
row. [20] describes a data structure to effectively store this information by parsing
the ciphertext. Given a transposition key
𝐾 = (𝑘1, 𝑘2, 𝑘3, ...𝑘𝑛)
the digraph matrix D is given by
𝐷 = 𝐷𝑘1,𝑘2 +𝐷𝑘2,𝑘3 + · · ·+𝐷𝑘𝑛−1,𝑘𝑛 +𝐷𝑘𝑛,𝑘1′
where 𝐷𝑖,𝑗 is the digraph frequencies matrix when column 𝑗 is next to column 𝑖 and
𝐷𝑖,𝑗′ accounts for the digraph frequencies for the wrap around case
If we were to apply the Jakobsen’s algorithm directly to this case, then, during
every iteration, we would need to swap the rows and columns for each 𝐷𝑖,𝑗 matrix.
This would be time consuming. Instead, it is shown in [20] that swapping the rows
and columns of the 𝐸 matrix would yield the same score. Hence we avoid the cost of
recomputing the 𝐷 matrix during every iteration. With this modification, the steps
to compute the score for each putative key is given by:
∙ Assemble the 𝐷 matrix from the already computed 𝐷𝑖,𝑗 matrices, based on the
key 𝐾
∙ s =∑︀ |𝑒𝑖𝑗 − 𝑑𝑖𝑗|
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3.3 SSCT for Malware Detection
In order to use SSCT as a scoring technique for malwares, we need to represent
the data from the known virus files, which we will refer to as the model, as the
plaintext and the data from the file to be scored, as the ciphertext. In both the
model and the file to score, we take only the 𝑘 top opcodes. All other opcodes are
categorized as ‘other’.
The 𝐸 matrix should reflect the digraph statistics of all the files in the model.
The algorithm to compute this matrix is given in Table 11. To build this matrix,
we compute the normalized digraph frequencies for each file separately and sum up
the individual matrices to get the final 𝐸 matrix. It should be noted that in this
approach, we have two keys—one corresponding to the opcode substitution and the
other for the columns transposition in the matrix. We will denote the former as the
substitutionKey and the latter as the transpositionKey.
Table 11: Compute 𝐸 Matrix
Initialize 𝐸 to 0
for each file in model
Initialize digraph matrix 𝑚 to 0
opcodeCurrent = readOpcode from file
opcodeNext = readOpcode from file
total = 0
while opcodeNext is not NULL
𝑚[opcodeCurrent][opcodeNext] + +
opcodeCurrent = opcodeNext
opcodeNext = readOpcode from file
total++
end while
𝑚 = 𝑚/total
𝐸 = 𝐸 +𝑚
end for
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The opcodes from the file to be scored are populated in a matrix. This would
be our ciphertext matrix 𝐶. We use this to compute the 𝐷𝑖,𝑗 matrices. We then
guess an initial substitution key based on the opcode frequencies in the model and
the file to score. The unknown file is scored using a nested hill climb approach against
the model. The algorithm used to compute the score is outlined in Table 12. This
function, in turn, calls the Jakobsen’s algorithm explained in Table 13.
Table 12: Compute Score
Input: currentScore
Initialize transposition key 𝐾
tempKey = 𝐾
𝑎 = 0
𝑏 = 0
score = 0
while 𝑏 < 𝐾𝐸𝑌 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸
temp = tempKey[𝑎]
tempKey[𝑎] = tempKey[𝑏]
tempKey[𝑏] = temp
𝑎++
if 𝑎+ 𝑏 < 𝐾𝐸𝑌 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸
tempScore = Jakobsen(tempKey, currentScore)
if tempScore < currentScore and tempScore! = 0
currentScore = tempScore
𝐾 = tempKey
𝑎 = 0
𝑏 = 1
end if
else
𝑎 = 0
𝑏++
tempKey = 𝐾
end if
end while
return currentScore
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Table 13: Jakobsen’s Algorithm
Input: 𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝐾𝑒𝑦, 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒
𝑎 = 0
𝑏 = 0
score = 0
while 𝑏 < 26
𝑖 = 𝑎
𝑗 = 𝑎+ 𝑏
swap substitutionKey[𝑎], substitutionKey[𝑎+ 𝑏]
swap 𝑖𝑡ℎ and 𝑗𝑡ℎ rows and columns in 𝐸
score = GetScoreForKey(tempKey)
if score < currentScore
currentScore = score
𝑎 = 0
𝑏 = 1
else
swap substitutionKey[𝑎], substitutionKey[𝑎+ 𝑏]
swap 𝑖𝑡ℎ and 𝑗𝑡ℎ rows and columns in 𝐸
𝑎++
if 𝑎+ 𝑏 >= 26
𝑎 = 0
𝑏++
end if
end if
end while
return currentScore
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CHAPTER 4
Experiments and Results
Malware are categorized into several families based on their characteristics. As
anyone would correctly assume, the response to any malware detection technique
differs from one family to another. In this chapter, we will briefly describe the several
malware families we have considered and present our experiments and their results.
4.1 Dataset
The SSCT implementation described in this project has been run on several
malware families like Metamorphic Worm (MWOR), Next Generation Virus Creation
Kit (NGVCK), Cridex, Security Shield, ZBOT, Smart HDD, Harebot and Winwebsec.
A brief description of these families is given below.
∙ MWOR [12] is a type of worm that includes a metamorphic engine. This meta-
morphic engine is responsible in mutating the worm across generations, helping
it to evade detection by security systems
∙ NGVCK is a self replicating, metamorphic virus. The NGVCK morphing engine
uses techniques like function ordering and dead code insertion to morph the
virus [18]
∙ Cridex is a Trojan that spreads by infecting removable disk drives. It infects
the system by creating a backdoor entry point [9]
∙ Security Shield is a variant of the winwebsec family. It is a malicious software
that displays fake alerts in the system [10]
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Table 14: Dataset
Family Number of files
MWOR 100
NGVCK 50
Cridex 74
Security Shield 58
ZBOT 2136
Smart HDD 68
Harebot 53
Winwebsec 4360
Benign set 214
∙ ZBOT or Zeus is a trojan horse that steals information from infected systems
by techniques like form grabbing [17]
∙ Smart HDD is a virus that disables the security softwares in the infected sys-
tems [7]
∙ Harebot is a rootkit that uses keystroke logging to get unauthorized information
from the infected system
∙ Winwebsec is a malicious software that displays fake warning messages and
popups in the infected system [11]
Benign files used in the experiments for Linux malware were taken from several Linux
utility programs like mv, cp, mkdir etc., Several Cygwin utility files were used as the
benign files to score the malware files for Windows platform. The number of virus
files in each family can be found in Table 14. All the files in each family were grouped
into five sets and a five fold cross validation was done in order to obtain the malware
and the benign scores.
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4.2 Parameters
When we disassemble both the malware and the benign files, we find that they
contain a large number of distinct opcodes. Of these opcodes, only a certain number of
them appear consistently and contribute to the inherent malicious or benign nature
of these files. All other opcodes occur quite infrequently and can collectively be
categorized as the ‘other’ category. Hence, the opcode sequence of the files now
contain the top 𝐾 frequently occurring opcodes and the ‘other’ opcodes. In the
previous research involving Simple Substitution Distance [8], it has been shown that
taking the top 25 distinct opcodes yields the best results. Hence, in our experiments,
we adopt the same value.
We have tried out three different approaches for our implementation. In the first
approach, we use the same number of columns for all the test files and compute their
scores. This is repeated for various column configurations, that is, all test files are
scored by arranging them in a two column matrix first, then 5, 10 and so on. In the
second approach, each file is scored using various number of columns and then the
scores are collected for all test files. Since the scores did not differ from each other by
a large margin, and since the first approach is faster, we have continued all further
experiments using the first approach. The third approach uses Index Coincidence
scores to find the correct column permutation and then uses a hill climb approach
to arrive at the best possible substitution key. The difference between this and the
first two approaches is that, in this approach, we separate the transposition and the
substitution layers in our problem. We have tested this approach on a subset of
Winwebsec files. Figure A.24 and Figure A.23 represent the ROC curve and the
scatter plots for this approach.
In this project, we have also experimented with different number of columns for
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the ciphertext matrix shown in Table 10. The number of columns taken were 2, 5,
10, 15, 20 and 25. Since the score obtained was the same in all these cases and since
the running time is lesser when the number of columns is 2, we have continued all
our experiments using that value.
4.3 Results
We obtained the malware and benign scores for the test data from the experi-
ments we carried out on the different malware families. Using this data, we calculate
the false positive and the false negative rates for each of the families and use them
to plot Receiver Operating Characteristics curve (ROC curve) [5]. The area under
the ROC curve (AUC value) is a value between 0 and 1, inclusive. This value gives
the probability with which our system will correctly classify any random file as a
malware or a benign file [3]. Table 15 gives a comparison of the AUC values for
the different malware families obtained by using the SSCT, SSD and HMM tech-
niques [1, 2, 16, 15, 14]. The visualization of the results in this table are provided
through scatterplots and ROC curves for each of the families and are included in the
Appendix A.
As we see from Table 15, for some families, the AUC value obtained using the
SSCT technique is 1, which is the ideal value we strive for, and for a few others,
the value drops. The AUC value of 1 is obtained when there is a clear demarcation
between the malware and the benign scores. For example, from the scatterplot of
these values for the family NGVCK given in Figure 1, we see that the range of values
for the malware and benign scores do not overlap. As, a result, we have a perfect
ROC curve with an AUC value of 1, as shown in Figure 2. On the other hand, in
the case of the Cridex family of malware, there is some overlapping of the malware
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Table 15: AUC values
Malware Family AUC using SSCT AUC using SSD AUC using HMM
MWOR0.5 0.51 1 1
MWOR1 0.58 1 0.99
MWOR1.5 0.70 0.9921 0.9625
MWOR4 0.80 0.9933 0.8225
NGVCK 1 1 1
Cridex 0.96288 0.58306 0.596
SecurityShield 1 0.62902 0.994
ZBOT 0.867 0.8664 0.9874
Smart HDD 1 0.8855 0.99875
Harebot 1 0.5606 1
Winwebsec 0.7328 0.8374 1
and the benign scores, as shown in Figure 3. This results in the ROC curve shown
in Figure 4. The scatterplot and the corresponding ROC curves for the remaining
families are included in the Appendix A.
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Figure 1: Scatter Plot NGVCK
We see from Table 15 that the SSCT scores give a better result compared to
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Figure 2: NGVCK ROC Curve
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Figure 3: Scatter Plot Cridex
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Figure 4: Cridex ROC Curve
the other techniques considered in the literature. We can attribute this performance
improvement to two factors. First is the opcode substitution which is handled by the
substitutionKey in our implementation. This addresses morphing techniques that
replace opcodes with other interchangeable opcodes. It should be noted that the
SSD technique also handles this case. The second, and the distinguishing factor, is
the column transpositions in our ciphertext matrix, handled by the transpositionKey.
Rearranging the columns in the matrix could account for morphing techniques that
use sub-routine re-ordering and hence increase the detection rate in morphed malware.
This might also be the reason causing this technique to not perform as well as the
SSD method, in case of families like Winwebsec.
Another interesting fact to note from the results is that, when we observe the
scatter plots in Figure A.5 to Figure A.8 in Appendix A for the different padding
ratios in the MWOR family, the gap between the benign and the malware scores
20
seems to increase with the increase in the padding ratio. This can be due to the fact
that as more and more dead code is inserted, the malware files become more similar
to one another than to the benign files.
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CHAPTER 5
Conclusion and Future Work
In this project we have implemented the SSCT algorithm to score several malware
families. Our implementation takes a set of training files and builds a model out
of those files. This model is then used to score a set of test files, which may be
benign or malign. One of the challenging aspects of this project was to represent the
information from all the files in the training set, in the model. We have used five fold
cross validation to ensure that the results are unbiased. Our experiments were carried
out on several hundreds of malware files across different families and this has given
us a chance to observe how each of these families reacts to this scoring technique.
In addition to the SSCT module, we have also implemented the SSD technique to
compare our scores and to verify the correctness of our implementation.
On comparing the SSCT scores with the scores from previous researches like the
Simple Substitution Distance for malware detection, we see that the SSCT technique
gives better results in many families.
This project has sufficient scope for future research and optimization. Currently,
we observe an increase in the running time of the module when the number of columns
is increased. This aspect has definite room for improvement and any future work can
attempt to optimize the running time of the algorithm. Another aspect that could
be improved is the performance of the SSCT technique on families like Winwebsec
and MWOR, where the detection rate is lower than that of the rate for the SSD
method. We can try out different swapping techniques for the substitution key and
the transposition key as discussed in [8] and compare the AUC values obtained in
22
each case. In this project, except for the MWOR family, we have not taken the
padded variants of other families. It would be interesting to see if the SSCT method
continues to detect these other families even with increased padding ratios.
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APPENDIX
Experiments
In this section, we provide the scatterplots and the ROC curves for all the families
we have experimented on. When running the experiments on each of the families, we
recorded the malware scores and the benign scores and used these to generate the
scatterplots shown in figures A.5 to A.13. From these scores, we calculated the true
positive and the false positive rates and used them to generate the ROC curves shown
in figures A.14 to A.22. The ROC curves given here correspond to the AUC values
displayed in Table 15.
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Figure A.5: Scatter Plot MWOR 0.5
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Figure A.6: Scatter Plot MWOR 1
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Figure A.7: Scatter Plot MWOR 1.5
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Figure A.8: Scatter Plot MWOR 4
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Figure A.9: Scatter Plot SecurityShield
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Figure A.10: Scatter Plot ZBOT
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Figure A.11: Scatter Plot SmartHDD
29
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Test Files
S
co
re
Malware
Benign
Figure A.12: Scatter Plot Harebot
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Figure A.13: Scatter Plot Winwebsec
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Figure A.14: MWOR0.5 ROC Curve
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Figure A.15: MWOR1 ROC Curve
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Figure A.16: MWOR1.5 ROC Curve
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Figure A.17: MWOR4 ROC Curve
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Figure A.18: SecurityShield ROC Curve
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Figure A.19: ZBOT ROC Curve
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Figure A.20: SmartHDD ROC Curve
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Figure A.21: Harebot ROC Curve
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Figure A.22: Winwebsec ROC Curve
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Figure A.23: Scatter Plot Winwebsec IC Scores
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Figure A.24: Winwebsec ROC Curve(IC Scores)
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